Barnabas Fund response to Ben White’s Review of Patrick Sookhdeo’s book ‘Global Jihad’

Barnabas Fund Response

to Ben White’s Book Review

of Patrick Sookhdeo, Global Jihad: The Future in the Face of Militant Islam, (McLean, VA, USA: Isaac Publishing, 2007)

 

by David Zeidan and Tawfik Hamid

1.David Zeidan

Introduction

Ben White’s review of Patrick Sookhdeo’s Global Jihad, published on the Fulcrum website, is a robust critique of the author’s stance on the issues addressed in the book. This paper is mainly a response to some of White’s specific criticisms, but some preliminary observations are in order regarding his methodology.

First, like all reviewers of all books, White has his own general worldview and specific standpoints, and these (inevitably and properly) inform his comments. But this process becomes less proper if it leads a reviewer into a fallacy, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it has done so in White’s review. The focus given to the person and activities of the author of the book is unusual if not necessarily excessive, but White also describes those who have endorsed the British edition as “senior figures, either retired or still active, from the military establishment” and those of the American edition as right-wing, neo-conservative, pro-Israel and supporters of George Bush.

The presence of these descriptions seems to be an attempt to denigrate the book by associating it with a particular political stance, which the author assumes to be suspect. But not only is this an imputation of guilt by association, which is hardly fair; it also disallows that the book may even in principle challenge the reviewer’s own worldview. The possibility that an assessment of the work on its merits might subvert some of the political assumptions that White brings to the discussion, and give more credence to some of those who have commended the book, should not be excluded from the start. Unless it is excluded, the approval of these people cannot rightly be used as a ground for criticising the text.

A similar point might be made about White’s critique of Sookhdeo’s use of material from pro-Israeli groups, specifically Palestinian Media Watch and the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Like all sources, these should be assessed with care and due reference to the authors’ presuppositions, but their link to Israel should not in itself call their testimony into question, especially since MEMRI’s translations of Arabic documents are widely recognised to be among the best available.

Secondly, White appears to pick out a very few quotes that he judges suitable to establish his claims while ignoring a much larger quantity of material in the book that establishes its thesis. The book in fact contains 1133 references, which include many quotes from Muslim source texts, classical Muslim scholars and modern Muslim scholars and thinkers as well as Islamist and radical Islamist leaders, and which Sookhdeo uses in support of his argument. Yet White mentions only one from what he regards as a dubious source (p196, n531, Randall Price) and one that he says is misquoted (p196, n534, Hamid Enayat).

Thirdly, White focuses on a few issues (such as taqiyya) at the expense of the main thrust of Sookhdeo’s book, which is the history and development of the Muslim concept of jihad, based mainly on Muslim source texts, scholarly works and modern Muslim discourse, as a key framework regulating the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslims. As a result the review does not give an accurate picture of the book’s structure.

 

Political decontextualisation?

White suggests that Sookhdeo practises political decontextualisation, ignoring political conflicts as motivating factors in Islamic terrorism and claiming that Islamists are motivated only by theology. He admits that Sookhdeo does mention some political contexts, but argues that he does not examine them in sufficient depth.

Yet Sookhdeo accepts that local political contexts, as well as a whole gamut of other factors, have some role to play in radicalising Muslims, while arguing that it is their combination with religious motivations that is the catalyst for radicalisation. “Local grievances combined with a strong allegiance to a collective religious identity can lead to instability and conflict.”(p43, italics added). Sookhdeo fully acknowledges (p103) that:

Of course most Muslims would respond that these are mainly liberation struggles and argue, quite rightly, that Muslims have faced varying degrees of discrimination and hostility in many of these contexts.

However, in his view local political grievances are all subsumed into the overarching Muslim concept of jihad, which since the rise of Islam has been used to shape Muslim attitudes to non-Muslims and to justify aggressive and violent responses to them.

Following the 7/7 London bombing, even the British Muslim journalist, Rageh Omar posed the question of what was unique about Islam that motivated Muslims to such actions (quoted by Sookhdeo, p. 44):

Why was it four Muslims who blew themselves up? Why have other marginalised communities not produced suicide bombers? (Rageh Omar, Only Half of Me: Being a Muslim in Britain. Viking: London, 2006, p13)

White has relatively little to say about jihad, which is the main thrust of the book. While Sookhdeo, and the wide range of Muslim sources and thinkers he quotes, are convinced of the importance of the religious and theological motives of Islamic terrorists and their supporters and sympathisers, White strongly de-emphasises these relative to contemporary politics as motives for Islamic radicalism and terrorism. His view seems to reflect the widely discredited secularisation theory that religion in the modern world would be progressively marginalised in all cultures and its hold on society diminished until the public square was totally devoid of its presence. But the contemporary world, and especially the Muslim world, is massively religious, and powerful religious movements are sweeping across the globe. Only Europe seems to be, so far, an exception to this rule. It cannot be assumed that Muslims share a secular conceptual framework and therefore cannot have any religious motivation for their hatred of the West and for their terrorism.

White does not properly address (even so far as is possible within a review article) the vast amount of evidence compiled by Sookhdeo from Islamic sources that supports the latter’s thesis. In positing a much looser connection between religion and politics, White appears to ignore the fact that for most Muslims Islam is both religion and politics, and that the unity between the two is a main conviction of all Islamist movements. Dislike of America, of Israel, and of Evangelical fundamentalists also seems to diminish his view of the defects in Islam.

 

Osama bin Laden

White offers some quotes from Osama bin Laden that refer to Muslim political grievances against the West and concludes that these are all that drive him. But a detailed study of radical Islamist discourse reveals that these are but one part of its discourse, aimed at a Western audience and at radicalising Muslims in their local context. Much more space in bin Laden’s discourse is given to expounding his theological stance and his theological justification for his attitudes and actions. Bin Laden is clear in his theologically based enmity to the very core values of the West, and he appeals to Muhammad’s example of waging jihad against infidels everywhere until they submit to Islamic dominion:

Regarding which shared understandings, exactly, is it possible that we agree with the immoral West? ... What commonalities, if our foundations contradict, rendering useless the shared extremities – if they even exist? For practically everything valued by the immoral West is condemned under sharia law ... [T]he issues most prominent in the West revolve around secularism, homosexuality, sexuality, and atheism ... As for this atmosphere of shared understandings, what evidence is there for Muslims to strive for this? What did the Prophet, the Companions after him, and the righteous forebears do? Did they wage jihad against the infidels, attacking them all over the earth, in order to place them under the suzerainty of Islam in great humility and submission? Or did they send messages to discover “shared understandings” between themselves and the infidels in order that they may reach an understanding whereby universal peace, security, and natural relations would spread – in such a satanic manner as this? Thesharia provides a true and just path, securing Muslims, andproviding peace to the world. (Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader. New York: Broadway Books, 2007, pp31, 37)

And:

As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarized by the Most High's Word: “You have a good example in Abraham and those with him. They said to their people: ‘We disown you and what you worship besides Allah. We renounceyou. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us--till you believe in Allah alone’” [60:4]. So there is an enmity, evidenced by fierce hostility, and an internal hate from the heart. And this fierce hostility – that is, battle – ceases only if the infidel submits to the authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [a dhimmi], or if the Muslims are [at that point in time] weak and incapable [of spreading Shari'a law to the world]. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the hearts, this is great apostasy; the one who does this [extinguishes the hate from his heart] will stand excuseless before Allah. Allah Almighty's Word to His Prophet recounts in summation the true relationship: "O Prophet! Wage war against the infidels and hypocrites and be ruthless. Their abode is hell--an evil fate!" [9:73]. Such, then, is the basis and foundation of the relationship between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity, and hatred – directed from the Muslim to the infidel – is the foundation of our religion. And we consider this a justice and kindness to them. The West perceives fighting, enmity, and hatred all for the sake of the religion as unjust, hostile, and evil. But whose understanding is right--our notions of justice and righteousness, or theirs? (Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader. New York: Broadway Books, 2007, p43)

The Palestinian question

White suggests that Sookhdeo claims the conflict in Israel/Palestine is essentially a religious one between Muslims and Jews and that there is no possibility of peace. But in the quoted passage (p117) Sookhdeo is actually summarising the view of the Islamist movement Hamas as expressed in the Hamas Charter (a document not mentioned by White). The following are direct quotes from the Charter:

Article 13:

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.

Article 15:

It is necessary to instill in the minds of the Moslem generations that the Palestinian problem is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis. Palestine contains Islamic holy sites. In it there is al- Aqsa Mosque which is bound to the great Mosque in Mecca in an inseparable bond as long as heaven and earth speak of Isra` (Mohammed's midnight journey to the seven heavens) and Mi'raj (Mohammed's ascension to the seven heavens from Jerusalem). (“The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18 August 1988”, YaleLawSchool, The Avalon Project).

The Hamas Charter is a clearly anti-Semitic document. It depicts all Jews (not just Zionists or Israelis) as eternal enemies of Islam and under God’s curse and wrath. Israel, simply by virtue of being Jewish and having a Jewish population, defies Islam and the Muslims (article 28). Islam must eliminate Israel. Old Muslim anti-Jewish traditions based on the Qur’an and hadith are used as in the Foreword to the Charter. The Charter includes modern Western anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, quoting the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (article 32). Jews are said to lurk behind all the evils in the world: capitalism, usury, the French and Russian revolutions, Freemasonry, Rotary Clubs, Lions Club, Bnai Brith, World War I and the abolition of the Caliphate, the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations and the United Nations. All these have been used to destroy Muslim and Arab unity (articles 22, 28, 32). The Charter invokes the Hadith of the Hour “The Hour will not come until Muslims will fight Jews”, thus portraying the fight against Israel into an apocalyptic war of the end times (article 7).

To the extent that the Hamas Charter governs the organisation’s actions, it must surely be conceded that the prospects for peace in the region are indeed remote.

 

Excessive generalisation concerning Islam?

White criticises Sookhdeo for a tendency towards generalisation and broad culturally deterministic statements that counterpoise the West against Islam. Yet this is not a problem in itself, as scholars need to find a balance between particularity and generality. Too great a concentration on specific details leaves one unable to see the wood for the trees. A wide-ranging theory must always be offered, including broad generalisations that can integrate a mass of diverse details and serve as an organising principle for mapping the descriptive facts into a total explanatory system.

Whitecriticises Sookhdeo’s view that violence and domination are intrinsic to classical Islam, and that terrorists are above all theologically rather than politically motivated. He does not address the statements by Muslims themselves, presented by Sookhdeo (p12), that jihad is the basis of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. These sources include a reputable Muslim scholar, Majid Khadduri, and the Supreme Judge of Jordan in 1968, Sheikh Abdullah Ghosheh.

White denies that the goal of Islamists is to rule the whole world; yet most of them claim this explicitly. A renowned Palestinian-American Islamic scholar, Ismai‘l Raji al-Faruqi, explicitly makes this claim (quoted by Sookhdeo, p91):

Islam asserts that the territory of the Islamic state is the whole earth or, better, the whole cosmos since the possibility of space travel [is] not too remote. Part of the earth may be under direct rule of the Islamic state and the rest may yet have to be included; the Islamic state exists and functions regardless. Indeed its territory is ever expansive. So is its citizenry, for its aim is to include all humankind. If the Islamic state is at any time restricted to a few of the world’s population, it does not matter as long as it wills to comprehend humanity. (Isma‘il Raji al-Faruqi, Islam. Brentwood, Maryland: International Graphics, 1984, p60)

Bassam Tibi, a Muslim scholar living in Germany, also describes the obligation in classical Islam of subjugating all non-Muslim peoples and states (pp126-127):

At its core Islam is a religious mission to all humanity. Muslims are religiously obliged to disseminate the Islamic faith throughout the world: “we have sent you forth to all mankind” (Saba 34:28). If non-Muslims submit to conversion or subjugation, this call (da‘wa) can be pursued peacefully. If they do not, Muslims are obliged to wage war against them. In Islam, peace requires that non-Muslims submit to the call of Islam, either by converting or by accepting the status of a religious minority (dhimmi) and paying the imposed tax, jizya. World peace, the final stage of the da‘wa, is reached only with the conversion or submission of all mankind to Islam. (Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam”, in Terry Nardin, ed., The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, p130).

And according to Majid Khadduri, in classical Islam jihad is the way to achieve this world dominion (p98):

The jihad was therefore employed as an instrument both for the universalization of religion and the establishment of an imperial world state. (Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p51).

White also challenges Sookhdeo’s use of the classical Islamic division of the world into the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War and the duty of changing the second into the first. Again, Majid Khadduri has this to say (p101):

Thus the jihad, reflecting the normal war relations existing between Muslims and non-Muslims, was the state’s instrument for transforming the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam. (Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p53).

White critiques Sookhdeo’s view that in important respects Islam is different from other religions and cultures. But Abdel Beri Atwan, the Palestinian editor of the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi, says (p36):

Islam is very different from most of the celestial and non-celestial religions … The Islamic creed and the concept of the nation, surpass the concept of citizenship and nationality. A Muslim person is a Muslim first, then Pakistani or Indian or Egyptian or British. If this concept had retreated for many reasons, among which is the spread of secularism during the times of the leftist or communist tide, these campaigns that are looming in the West and are targeting Islam, have began to bring it back strongly in these last few years. (Abdel Beri Atwan, “The Pope has Wronged [Muslims] … And Should Apologize”, Al-Quds al-Arabi,18 September 2006.

For Atwan, a fairly secularised Muslim intellectual, and for many like him, Islam is different, and they are proud of it. They certainly would not accept that all cultures and religions are essentially similar, or that in all key particulars they conform to Western norms. In no respect should they be assumed to do so.

 

Critique of Sookhdeo’s views on taqiyya

White devotes several paragraphs of his review to a critique of Sookhdeo’s views on the Muslim practice of taqiyya (dissimulation). He claims that Sookhdeo has cited only one reference for his claim that “[I]n classical Islam Muslims are permitted to lie in certain situations, one of which is war”. But in the chapter “Taqiyya” Sookhdeo offers considerable evidence from the Muslim source texts of Qur’an and Sunni hadith. These are based on Muhammad’s example and teaching, which are compelling for all Muslims.

White would seem to be mistaken in saying that taqiyya is an exclusive Shi‘a doctrine. Sookhdeo agrees (p196) that the Shi‘a were especially involved in the development of the doctrine, he goes on to prove that Sunnis too approve of it and practise it in appropriate circumstances. A hadith from the authoritative Sunni collection of Bukhari is quoted, affirming the eternal validity of taqiyya (p199):

Al-Hasan said: At-taqiyya (i.e., speaking against one’s own beliefs lest his opponents put him in great danger) will remain till the day of Resurrection.” (The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari, Arabic – English, Vol. 9, Book 89. Translated by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers and Distributors, 1997).

The view of the famous Sunni scholar Ibn Taimiyya is also presented on the same page, and a fatwa on the Sunni website Islam Online on the following page.

In addition, taqiyya is clearly taught by radical Sunni Islamist groups. Abu Muhammad Asim al Maqdisi, a radical Sunni Islamist scholar and mentor of the Jihadi-Salafis, who deeply hate the Shi‘a, has this to say on taqiyya as used for war:

And know, after that, that there is no contradiction between acting upon the Millah of Ibrahim and taking the precautions in secrecy and concealing the hostilities used to give victory to the religion. And the sum of our words does not reject this great precaution, which the Prophet used to take. And the evidence upon that from his biographical accounts (Sirah) is more than can be counted ... And the summary of the matter is: Secrecy in the (Operational Military) Preparation and Planning; Openness in the Da‘wah and the Conveyance”.(Abu Muhammad ‘Asim Al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim (The Religion of Ibrahim) and the Calling of the Prophets and Messengers, English translation, second edition. Al Tibyan Publications, pp70-71)

And further:

And with your understanding of this point, another important benefit becomes clear to you, which is the permissibility of deceiving the disbelievers and some of the Muslims hiding amongst their ranks, during the confrontations and the fighting, as long as the religion (Din) is apparent and the basis (Asl) of the Da‘wah is famous. (ibid. p77)

Sookhdeo also offers examples of modern, mainly Sunni Muslims, who have accused some of the Muslim religious leaders of double-talk and hypocrisy (a part of taqiyya).

White also claims that Sookhdeo has misquoted the Muslim scholar Hamid Enayat on the practice of taqiyya by Sunnis. Enayat, however, refers to the Sunni Egyptian Ahmad Amin, who admitted that “Sunnis too have practiced taqiyah - though with a difference”. (Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought.1982, p61).

The Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi explains why Muslims can claim that Islam was always peaceful (p104):

Jihad and the expansion of Islam through war are not seen by Muslims as aggression, but as the God-ordained method of attaining to the ultimate peace under the dominion of Islam. The wars to disseminate Islam are not described by the Arabic word for war, harb, but by futuh, literally opening (of the world to Islam). The non-Muslims who stand in the way of the spread of Islam, creating obstacles to its mission (da‘wa), are held responsible for the resulting state of war.The obstinate refusal of non-Muslims to accept Islam is viewed as aggression, as they hinder Islam in its God-ordained path to victory. (Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam”, in Terry Nardin, ed., The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, p130).

In this view aggression is liberation, war is peace and the victim is the culprit.

Afghanistan

White asserts that the Afghan jihad is hardly discussed in Sookhdeo’s book and claims that there is only a brief mention of the US and Saudi help that was given to the jihadists. In fact there are several passages dealing with the Afghan jihad against the Soviets and its ramifications. Thus on p116 it is said that American, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian aid was given to the Afghan jihad. On p338 it is explained how the many diverse jihadists in the Afghan jihad co-operated and influenced each other’s ideologies, thus spreading the ideas of the takfir and jihad groups. The instigating of radicalisation in their home countries by the returning mujahidin and the development of new fronts for the global jihad are also recounted. On p434 Sookhdeo explains how the Americans made the mistake of regarding religion (Islam) as neutral during their support of the Afghan jihad, thinking they could channel the religious conviction of the mujahidin to serve their own agenda. This policy led to the detrimental growth of the radical Islamist movements, who later turned on their makers.

‘Demographic jihad’

White is sceptical about Sookhdeo’s warnings regarding the manipulation of demographics by Islamists. Yet various Muslim leaders and Islamists undoubtedly see the Muslim population explosion and migration as a weapon in the quest for Islamic dominion. The following quotes clarify the way at least some Muslims think on this issue:

In 1974 Algerian President Houari Boumedienne (1976-1978) stated in the General Assembly of the United Nations:

One day millions of men will leave the southern hemisphere of this planet to burst into the northern one. But not as friends. Because they will burst in to conquer, and they will conquer by populating it with their children. Victory will come to us from the wombs of our women.(Houari Boumedienne, quoted in Brendan Bernhard, “The Fallaci Code”, LA Weekly, 15 March 2006, http://www.laweekly.com/index.php?option=com_lawcontent&task=view&id=12921&Itemid=47, viewed 15 August 2008)

The famous charismatic Egyptian Muslim preacher, ‘Amr Khalid, recently stated that Muslims will form a majority in Europe within 20 years:

The Muslims keep having children, while the Europeans do not – this means that within 20 years the Muslims will be the majority.(‘Amr Khalid, in an interview on Dream 2 TV, 10 May 2008, quoted in MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 2003, 27 July 2008)

Muammar al-Qaddafi, leader of Libya, proclaims a similar message:

We have 50 million Muslims in Europe. There are signs that Allah will grant Islam victory in Europe – without swords, without guns, without conquests. The fifty million Muslims of Europe will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades. (Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi in a speech aired by Al-Jazeera TV on 10 April 2006, quoted in MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 1152, 2 May 2006)

Mullah Krekar, a Kurdish Islamist radical linked to terrorist groups in Iraq and granted asylum in Norway, recently claimed that Europe would be 30% Muslim by 2050:

We’re the ones who will change you ... Just look at the development within Europe, where the number of Muslims is expanding like mosquitoes. Every western woman in the EU is producing an average of 1.4 children. Every Muslim woman in the same countries are producing 3.5 children. By 2050, 30 percent of the population in Europe will be Muslim ... Our way of thinking ... will prove more powerful than yours. (“Krekar claims Islam will win”, Aftenposten, 13 March 2006)

Conclusion

The debate on Islamist jihad is and will remain a complex and difficult one. It behoves all participants in it to be aware of how their own worldview and standpoints affect their assessments, and to allow these to be challenged by relevant contrary evidence. It is also important for them to review the work of others, with whom perhaps they may disagree, carefully and rigorously, paying due attention to the merits of the texts and sources being considered. In light of the comments above, we are not convinced that White’s review fully meets these criteria, or that it is an altogether fair assessment of Sookhdeo’s book.

 

David Zeidan, 5 February 2009